Background: Evidence-based medicine is the application of research findings to
| INTRODUCTION
I owe my life to evidence-based medicine (EBM), 1 but that is not the story I want to tell in this article. Here, I want to tell a more critical story-of how the assiduous application of "good" evidence-based guidelines can sometimes result in a "bad" patient experience. My reflections are not intended as criticism of the particular doctors who treated me. They are pitched at a much wider audience: each and all of us who seek to apply evidence-based guidelines to individual patients.
Evidence-based medicine saves lives, but it is not perfect. 2 Valkenburg et al distinguish between limits to EBM that might someday be overcome by more research (either methodological or empirical) and more philosophical limits that are inherent to EBM's recommended approach. 3 The latter category, they argue, covers 2 main issues: first, that EBM standardizes the patient and second, that EBM standardizes moral considerations.
Evidence-based medicine standardizes the patient because (for example) evidence-based guidelines are based largely on findings from randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Conceptually speaking, RCTs are simple (indeed, somewhat crude) experiments: take a sample of individuals who meet particular inclusion criteria, allocate them at random to intervention or control arms, follow through to a predefined primary endpoint, and assess whether differences between the 2 arms are both clinically and statistically significant. The result, if definitive, can inform a recommendation in a guideline. Such a recommendation states (effectively) that, on average, people meeting inclusion criteria XYZ (and ignoring people meeting exclusion criteria PQR) will gain significant benefit from the intervention tested, compared with whatever was offered to those in the control arm. It does not (indeed, it cannot) mean that every individual meeting the inclusion criteria of the trial will benefit from the intervention. 4 Evidence-based medicine standardizes moral considerations because responsibility for the case-based moral question that drives every clinical decision ("what is the best thing to do for this patient, in these circumstances?") is, at least in part, removed from the clinician and assigned to the processes and procedures inscribed in an evidence-based guideline or recommendation.
The consequence of standardizing both the patient and the moral considerations of how to manage him or her means that (a) patientswho come in all shapes and sizes and with a vast range of co-morbidities, sociocultural influences, and personal idiosyncrasiesare wrongly assumed to conform to the "ideal type" patient around which the trial was designed and (b) the clinician is placed under powerful but clandestine moral pressure to align the management of this patient with the management of the ideal type.
An evidence-based guideline is rarely based on a single RCT. It is the product of a complex and laborious process of identifying, reviewing, and collating both primary evidence and systematic reviews (and most especially, meta-analyses and mega-trials). 5 The development of a new guideline, or the updating of an existing one, generally requires the convening of a panel of experts (clinical, academic, and-these days-1 or 2 "experts by experience" previously known as patients) whose credentials and conflicts of interest are carefully examined to ensure they are both capable and dispassionate. The "facts" in guidelines are regularly disputed of course, but there is more than a grain of truth in the claim that the effort, expense, and apparent rigour of the guideline development process place the clinician under substantial pressure to adhere to them.
Real-world clinicians are often rightly cautious of the "facts" in evidence-based guidelines, since the guideline development process and its documentation tend to generate a sanitized (and misleadingly clear-cut) account of how particular items of evidence and/or particular caveats were either included in, or excluded from, the guideline. As
Kelly and Moore have observed:
The principles of the elimination of the possibility of bias in the hierarchy of evidence, of the rule-driven principles of guideline development and appraisal are based on an ideal version of the scientific method, which owe more to the logical precepts of the a priori relations of ideas than they do to messy empirical observation. (page 10) 6 Before using a personal case study to illustrate the pickle that can result from uncritical adherence to evidence-based guidelines, I want to introduce a third philosophical limitation of EBM, which is a consequence of the 2 limitations described above. Because of its reliance on population-derived evidence, EBM drives (indeed, requires) the clinician to reason from the general to the particular, which cuts across traditional clinical assessment and management (which runs from the particular to the general).
To understand traditional clinical reasoning, we need to go back to an era before EBM became the norm. Back in 1982, Jerome Kassirer and colleagues published an article entitled "Toward a Theory of Clinical Reasoning." 7 In it, they reproduce a transcript of a discussion between one of them ("experimenter," E) and a doctor-subject (S), about a hypothetical patient (page 254) 7 :
E: This is a 57-year-old admitted to the hospital with the chief complaint of nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and frequency of urination. This individual-to-general reasoning, these authors argue, should be reflexive and informed by scientific evidence-but the latter can never replace the former.
In the remainder of this paper, I describe a personal experience to illustrate the dangers of replacing the sequence of dataunderstanding-judgement-deliberation centred on the patient with the apparently more rational approach of reaching immediately for an evidence-based guideline.
| A PERSONAL CASE HISTORY
Drawing on the principles of narrative research, 10 and more specifically those of auto-ethnography, 1 I present below a subjective account of a trauma incident and my recollections of how both the acute episode and its sequelae were managed.
Narrative research, of which auto-ethnography is one example, does not seek to produce hard facts, rather it is necessarily and irrevocably perspectival: one person's interpretations of their observations and experience. Indeed, the internationally renowned qualitative researcher Norman Denzin defines auto-ethnography as "an imaginative organisation of experience that imposes a distortion of truth" (page 13). For various reasons, it took a couple of hours to reach the hospital, by which time I was cold and shivering. A triage nurse, followed by a more senior nurse, asked me questions and gave me paracetamol.
My arms were X-rayed and confirmed a comminuted fracture of the left olecranon (elbow) and a severely impacted fracture of distal radius (forearm) on the right. An attempt to reduce the fractured radius under regional anaesthesia was unsuccessful. I was given more painkillers and put on the list for an operation the next day, where the fractures were realigned and repaired using internal fixation.
The afternoon following my accident, I was visited by a woman who introduced herself as the "falls co-ordinator." She was wearing a white coat and carrying a clipboard with a tick-box chart on it. She began to go through a structured list of questions, including "do you take four or more prescription drugs a day?" and "have you ever felt unsteady on your feet?". After a few of these questions, we both agreed that there was little point in continuing with the assessment, since my accident had not been the kind of fall that the designers of the guideline she was following had had in mind. We exchanged pleasantries and she wished me a speedy recovery.
In the weeks that followed, I struggled to rehabilitate myself and The question of whether a patient with an acute head injury should be offered imaging of the cervical spine is addressed in NICE Guideline 76. 12 The relevant section of the algorithm is shown in Figure 1 . It includes the situation where the patient is alert and oriented, but there is also "suspicion of cervical spine injury" along with a history of "fall from >1 metre" and/or "bicycle collision." My bicycle had somersaulted in a way that precipitated a fall from well over 1 metre, and whilst the cycle itself did not collide with anything (since I hit the ground before it did), its occupant collided twice with the concrete towpath.
The question then arises as to why a cervical spine injury was not suspected. The answer, I believe, is that whist the history I gave on admission to hospital was very similar to the account given above, the version that appeared in my medical record was closer to fractures of the distal radius, the condition is patterned very differently in different age groups. In both teenagers and adults aged up to 50 years, distal radius fractures are commoner in males and most commonly result from sporting or road traffic accidents; they are not associated with low bone density but linked to particular activities and lifestyles. 13 In the over 50s, distal radius fractures are more common in women (and usually show the classic fork shape); these
Colles fractures are associated with osteopenia (low bone density) and broadly follow the epidemiological pattern of other "fragility fractures" (eg, hip and thoracic spine). Here is where I think my well-meaning advisers went astray. First, they were aware of the evidence-based finding that most people with neck pain and even most people with cervical radiculopathy (that is, symptoms in the arms resulting from nerve root compression or tension) do no better following cervical spine surgery than they do with conservative management. 15 Second, they were aware that many if not most patients who are being considered as potential candidates for cervical spine surgery are suffering from common or garden cervical spondylosis and do not have "red flag" symptoms or signs. 15 It is therefore absolutely correct to say that, on average, patients who are contemplating going under the knife for their neck pain or neck-related arm pain (radiculopathy) would be ill-advised to rush into surgery. Now let us take a look at the NICE Clinical Knowledge Summary on neck pain. 16 It divides patients with radiculopathy into 3 groups:
those with "red flag" signs or symptoms; those without red flags and a history of less than 4 to 6 weeks; and those without red flags whose .
My search also identified 2 systematic reviews, both of which had sought to throw light on the controversy of whether NSAIDs delay bone healing in surgical patients. 20, 21 Both concluded that the evidence base was weak and conflicting; they called for more and better basic science studies as well as well-designed RCTs. One commented:
"Animal and in vitro studies present so conflicting data that even studies with identical parameters have opposing results" (page 1). 20 The strongly held view that NSAIDs should not be given after spinal surgery appears to be no more than a nonevidence-based meme.
This view was reflected in the advice of 1 or 2 surgeons in my Twitter following, who suggested (based on their clinical experience) that in the absence of specific contraindications, NSAIDs after spinal surgery are effective and safe and that they "get you up and about quickly."
My own medical history is relevant here: As a young adult, I sustained a number of stress fractures (metatarsal and tibial). They were treated with high-dose NSAIDs, and I returned to sport quickly (and ahead of prediction) in each case. So I knew that whatever had happened to experimental rats and patients undergoing hip replacement in methodologically weak studies in faraway places, in my case there was already evidence that NSAIDs did not delay healing of my bones.
| DISCUSSION
This study has considered how guidelines influenced-or failed to influence-4 aspects of a single clinical case study told from the perspective of the patient: (a) a guideline that existed and was relevant FIGURE 2 Extract from NICE Clinical Knowledge Summary "Cervical Radiculopathy" 16 but which was not used (imaging of the cervical spine in acute head injury); (b) a guideline that was not relevant but which was used (falls prevention in older people); (c) a guideline that was relevant but was misremembered and misapplied by commentators claiming to be giving evidence-based advice (management of cervical radiculopathy); and (d) a guideline that did not exist but which was quoted by adherents of EBM as if it had existed (and which was also misremembered and misapplied).
This case study suggests-though it does not itself prove-that despite a whole generation of research into EBM, the medical profession remains mired in the problem that Sir John Grimley Evans described in 1995:
There is a fear that in the absence of evidence clearly applicable to the case in the hand a clinician might be forced by guidelines to make use of evidence which is only doubtfully relevant, generated perhaps in a different grouping of patients in another country at some other time and using a similar but not identical treatment. This is evidence-biased medicine; it is to use evidence in the manner of the fabled drunkard who searched under the street lamp for his door key because that is where the light was, even though he had dropped the key somewhere else. (page 451) 22 Given the effort and expense that goes into producing guidelines, and the philosophical arguments in favour of case-based management set out in the Introduction, why are we continuing to use these resources in such a drunken way? I propose 3 explanations, the first 2 of which are psychological and the third sociological.
The first explanation is our inbuilt tendency to classify. As sociologists Geoff Bowker and Susan Leigh Star observed in their excellent book Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences, we create classification schemes (such as the ICD10 or targeted risk groups). 23 When we encounter a patient, instead of attending to the unique particularities of that individual, we hasten to classify them as a member of some group or other. Once we have done that, the average characteristics of the group not only inform but also become enshrined in clinical guidelines and recommendations. This has the effect of ossifying and reproducing our clinical and cultural stereotypes, which now appear as scientific "facts."
The second explanation is bounded rationality-that is, the idea that because real-world decisions often involve numerous options, outcomes, and contextual factors, we unconsciously simplify the problem to make it possible to cope with cognitively and manage practically. 24 Indeed, the inexorable pressures of modern clinical work often require us to use such "fast and frugal" reasoning. 25 As
Kahnemann showed in the book Thinking, Fast and Slow that won him the Nobel Prize for Economics, such heuristics give our species a survival advantage. 26 So it is not necessarily a bad thing that clinicians hasten to classify (so they can treat the group rather than the individual) and then apply an oversimplified version of rules and procedures. It does, however, follow that a critical dimension of clinical judgement is knowing (at least at an intuitive level) which patients to manage using fast thinking (based on crude classification) and which require us to revert to slow thinking (individualized management).
The third explanation for our drunken use of guidelines is the over-valuing of rationality (doing the thing right-as in following rules and guidelines) over reason (doing the right thing-as in making the right moral choice for this patient at this time, given these contingencies). As sociologist Andrew Sayer wrote in his book Why Things
Matter to People, 27 and as Anthony Giddens explored in The Constitution of Society, the encroachment of rationality over reason (and the particular phenomenon of the "expert system" that applies technology to impose distant rules and procedures over the granularity of local social situations) characterizes many sectors of modern society. 28 It is both a strength and a weakness of EBM that so much of clinical practice is now highly structured, based on rational classificatory schemes and standardized procedures, and auditable from a distance.
We depict clinical practice as the science of advanced rule-following rather than the practice of case-based moral reasoning. We train medical students, for example, to perform in predictable, standardized ways in highly standardized scenarios ("objective structured clinical examinations" or OSCEs), 29 with the implication that every time we manage renal colic, investigate pelvic pain, or break bad news, there is a universally "right" (and, implicitly, a "wrong") way of going about it.
The quote from the 1982 Kassirer paper reproduced in the Introduction suggests otherwise. In that scenario, the clinician is engaging (with considerable enthusiasm, it appears) with a unique and dynamically unfolding narrative, altering his or her assessment of the case iteratively as additional patient-derived evidence accumulates. antee that the right section of the right guideline will be applied to the right patient at the right time. On the contrary, the accumulation of unmanageable numbers of lengthy guidelines makes it ever more likely that the clinician at the front line will manage his or her patients using early categorization, frugal heuristics, and a privileging of operational rationality over case-based moral reasoning.
In light of this, how can we ensure that evidence-based guidelines are our servant rather than our master in our pursuit of good clinical care? At the very least, we must treat guidelines with the scepticism they deserve-remembering that the best of them is nothing more than a statement of what is likely to happen to the average member of a defined group of patients. We must also learn to value, and ensure that we seek, patient-based evidence through unfolding clinical 
